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1 Preemption and Theories of Federalism 
Robert R.M. Verchick and Nina Mendelson 
INTRODUCTION 
American government is an experiment in redundancy, with powers and 
duties shared among federal, state, and local decision makers. The arrange­
ment is designed to divide power, maximize self-rule, and foster innovation, 
but it also can breed confusion. In the areas of public safety and environ­
mental protection, state and federal leaders (to name the two most active 
players in these disputes) are often seen jockeying for the inside track, hoping 
to secure the resources or authority needed to promote their views of the 
public good or gain politically. To outside observers, the best outcomes are 
not obvious. For example, should the federal government be the exclusive 
regulator of automobile pollution, as it is of automotive fuel efficiency, or 
should (as U.S. Senators from California successfully argued in i967) Cali­
fornia also be allowed to set its own unique, more stringent standards? Should 
New Jersey be able to issue regulations requiring chemical plant managers to 
consider safer technology to reduce the risks of terrorism incidents, or should 
those requirements be imposed only if the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security allows them?' Should state judges or juries be allowed to conclude, 
applying state tort law, that a pharmaceutical company has negligently failed 
to warn patients of drug side effects if the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
has already approved the drug label? Deciding when federal law trumps state 
law can be a complicated process, involving the legislature, the judiciary, and 
even executive agencies. The guiding principles always include federalism. 
Federalism is concerned with the distribution of power between the federal 
government and state governments. Most significantly, the Constitution gives 
' As this book was going to press, Congress expressly resolved this question by adopting a savings 
clause for state law on chemical plant security. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. 
No. uo-161, S 534, 121 Stat. 1844, 2075 (2007) (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. S 121 note). 
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Congress the power to make laws in areas affecting interstate commerce, 
military defense, and civil rights. This delegation of powers contemplates 
some impingements on state autonomy. Meanwhile the TenthAm.endment 
reserves powers to the states. With a federal government of limited powers, 
and states wielding plenary powers, realms of separate sovereignty and polit­
ical accountability might seem to be the norm. Yet the modern understanding 
of the Constitution's provisions leaves generous room for state and federal 
overlap. Within these boundaries, however, Congress can use its lawmaking 
powers either to leave space for state authority or else to eclipse, or preempt, 
state power. The Constitution's Supremacy Clause makes clear that state law 
must yield to federal law as supreme. Preempting state law is not unfair, 
according to federalism theory, because political safeguards built within the 
legislative process (such as the fact that Senators are elected state by state) 
deter federal lawmakers from routinely bulldozing over the states' interests. 
This chapter focuses on Congress's preemption power and examines the most 
common legal and theoretical issues surrounding its use. 
The two most important questions about preemption are related. The first 
is for the lawmaker: when, or in what way, should Congress act to preempt 
state laws in favor of federal ones? The second is for the judge: how do you 
know that state law has been preempted? In answering the first question, 
policy makers must consider the relative strengths of federal and state regu­
lation. A more centralized federal approach promises uniformity, and with it 
fewer transaction costs associated with compliance, the containment of trans­
boundary "spillover" effects, and economies of scale. A more decentralized, 
state-based approach is associated with greater government responsiveness 
and citizen participation, allowances for regional variability, and helpful 
experimentation among states. 
As for the second question, sometimes Congress's intent to preempt state 
law is clear and plainly stated in a statute. But sometimes there is doubt. A 
statute may not declare preemption outright but may conflict with state law; 
or it may be so broad as to "occupy the field" of targeted regulation, leaving 
states with no power in the area. The courts have articulated a presumption, 
discussed in greater detail in the sections that follow, against reading a statute 
to preempt state law where Congress's intent is not clear. That somewhat 
inconsistently applied presumption is informed, in part, by concerns about 
not trenching on state authority or eclipsing state sovereignty "accidentally" 
without full consideration by a federal deliberative legislature. Besides exam­
ining the issues related to congressional decisions to preempt state law, this 
chapter will also examine the theoretical assumptions underlying judicial 
reluctance to read a statute as preempting state law. 
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PREEMPTION AND THE CONGRESS 
Reading the Constitution, one might think it utterly clear, as some have 
argued,2 that the federal government can freely preempt state governments 
from regulating the environment, pharmaceutical safety, employment rela­
tionships, or nearly any other subject that is within Congress's legislative 
authority. After all, the Constitution's Supremacy Clause states, "This Con­
stitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof . . .  shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of.any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding" (art. VI, cl. 2). Moreover, courts have 
long read the Commerce Clause, which authorizes Congress to regulate 
"Commerce . . .  among the several States" (art. II, Sec. 8, cl. 3), as an 
independent prohibition of state laws that discriminate against or unduly 
burden interstate commerce. 
In short, Congress could make policy for the nation, and its choices would 
be supreme notwithstanding contrary state government views. Assuming Con­
gress is properly using its constitutional powers (such as the power to regulate 
commerce), the only constitutional obstacle might be the Tenth Amendment, 
which suggests that some powers "not delegated to the United States . . .  are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." But that amendment has 
been interpreted by the courts to restrain Congress from preempting state 
authority only narrowly - by, for example, "commandeering" state employees 
or resources to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."3 As we see 
it, the Tenth Amendment today presents no other obstacle to federal preemption 
even in traditionally "local" fields such as the protection of health and safety. 
Despite Congress's broad preemptive power, many, if not most, areas of law 
are governed concurrently by federal and state governments. Lively debate 
continues in many settings about whether state regulatory authority should be 
forced to yield to federal power or whether Congress has actually acted to 
preempt state law and to what extent. The "presumption against preemption" 
applied by courts tends to moderate the extent to which states will be barred 
from regulating. Congress regularly legislates to share power or to preserve 
state authority. 
Given an effective federal government with far-reaching power to regulate, 
why preserve state authority to regulate? Debates on whether to preempt state 
2 See Caleb Nelson, "Preemption," VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 66, no. 3 (2000): 225. 
3 See PRINTZ v. UNITED STATES, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (quoting NEW YORK v. UNITED 
STATES, 505 U.S. 144, 157 [1992]). 
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law often draw on ideas of federalism - a general concern with the division of 
power between the federal and state governments and with maintaining core 
attributes of state sovereignty. A state's authority to devise its own laws is 
among these core aspects of state sovereignty.4 As developed in a recent series 
of cases, another core aspect is preserving a state's sovereign immunity from 
private lawsuits seeking money damages, a protection emphasized by a now 
expansively interpreted Eleventh Amendment. 5 
Federalism advocates identify several benefits of preserving a state's sover­
eignty and autonomy to regulate. First, some argue that strong state authority, 
of which authority to regulate is a part, is important to the scheme of separa­
tion of powers developed by the Framers of the Constitution. Like the division 
of powers among the judicial, executive, and legislative branches of the fed­
eral government, maintaining significant state government power can help 
avoid the undue concentration of power in the federal government and pre­
serve essential individual liberties.6 Moreover, where a federal program 
depends on state and local implementation or cooperation, the involvement 
of states might prompt the federal government toward helpful moderation of 
its policies. For example, after Congress enacted the USA Patriot Act, many 
state and local governments objected, with some directing their officials not to 
participate in parts of the program.7 
Second, if states possess robust authority to regulate, the policies 
chosen within a state will tend to be tailored to local concerns and to 
citizen preferences. For example, some western and southwestern states, 
where spicy Mexican candies are popular, monitor and regulate those 
candies for contamination with lead dust. 8 Although lead dust in these can­
dies presents a significant safety threat, especially to children, the federal 
4 See Robert R. M. Verchick, "The Commerce Clause, Environmental Justice, and the Inter­
state Garbage Wars," SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 70, no. 5 (1997): 1239. 
5 ALDEN V. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); COLL. SAV. BANK V. FLA. PREPAID POSTSECONDARY 
Eouc. EXPENSE Bo., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); FLA. PREPAID POSTSECONDARY Eouc. EXPENSE 
Bo. v. COLL. SAv. BANK, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
6 See, e.g., ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL V. SCANLON, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (the '"constitu­
tionally mandated balance of power' between the States and the Federal Government was 
adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection of 'our fundamental l iberties'"). 
7 See Susan Schmidt, "PATRIOT Act Misunderstood, Senators Say; Complaints About Civil 
Liberties Go Beyond Legislation's Reach, Some Insist," WASHINGTON POST, October 22, 2003, 
� (noting "nearly 200 cities and three states have passed resolutions contending that the 
PATRIOT Act . . .  tramples on civil liberties"); Ann Althouse, "The Vigor of Anti-Comman­
deering Doctrine in Times of Terror," BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW 69, no. 4 (2004): 1253. 
8 E.g., Deborah Vanpelt, "State Fears Candies Pose Health Risk; Mexican suckers pulled from 
shelves," TAMPA TRIBUNE, December 9, 1994, 1 (describing efforts of F lorida, California, 
Texas, and Arizona with respect to Mexican candies). 
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government failed for several years to give high priority to this regional 
issue.9 
Third, preserving state regulatory authority may also benefit citizens by 
prompting greater engagement in government. Citizens are often presumed 
to be able to participate more directly in policy making at the state level. 
Greater state autonomy to regulate will mean more opportunities for citizens 
to participate in governance and seek responsive government. That may result 
in greater "civic virtue" in citizens by encouraging them to become better 
informed and more actively engaged in all levels of government.10 Although it 
has been a benefit claimed for federalism, the goal of stimulating greater 
citizen engagement may logically lead to calls for concentrating power in 
localities, such as cities, rather than states. " 
Fourth, preserving state authority to regulate can mean, in the words of 
Justice Louis Brandeis, that the states are able to function as "laborator[ ies ]" 
that can try "novel social and economic experiments" to solve society's prob­
lems. Other states and the federal government may learn from or adopt one 
state's innovative approach, ultimately benefiting the entire country.12 To take 
this a step further, some scholars now argue that such regulatory innovation 
sets up a "competitive interaction" between the federal government and the 
states and among the states.'3 Professor Robert Schapiro develops this 
claim further in Chapter 2. Because citizens can compare the different 
responses of the federal and state governments to a particular problem, they 
may be better able to understand the range of options and hold government 
officials accountable for an inadequate response. That may in tum prompt 
regulators to be more thorough and more responsive to citizen preferences. 
For example, recent state and municipal efforts to reduce greenhouse gases 
9 In October 2006, the FDA finally issued guidance to industry indicating that if lead levels in 
candy likely to be eaten by small children exceeded the recommended level of 0.1 parts per 
million, the candy manufacturer could face enforcement action. See U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, "Guidance for Industry: Lead in Candy Likely to be Consumed Frequently by 
Small Children," (October 2006) (available at http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/ 
05d-0481-gdlooo2.pdf). 
10 See, e.g., GREGORY v. ASHCROFT, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). 
11 See Frank Cross, "The Folly of Federalism," CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 24, no. 1 (2002): i. 
12 See NEW STATE lcE Co. v. LIEBMANN, 285 U.S. 26z, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(describing states as "laborator[ies]"). 
13 Kirsten Engel, "Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law," 
EMORY LAW JouRNAL 59, no. 1 (2006): 159; Roderick Hills, "Against Preemption; How Fed­
eralism Can Improve the National Legislative Process,'' NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
82, no. 1 (2007): 1; Robert Schapiro, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: How A FEDERAL SYSTEM 
PROTECTS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming); 
William W. Buzbee, "Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling 
Distinction," NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 82, no. 6 (2007): 1547. 
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and address climate change have prompted a national dialogue questioning 
the extent of federal action on climate change. And federal action can 
also sidestep the pervasive risk of state failure to address a risk due to "free 
rider" temptations that could lead all states to delay in the hope that others 
will act. 
Notwithstanding the federalism-related benefits of preserving state author­
ity to regulate, there still may be reason to limit state control over a particular 
regulatory issue or to supplement it with federal regulation. A federal, rather 
than a state-focused, approach is more likely to effectively address problems 
that cross state lines. Consider a factory that dumps pollution in a rural Illinois 
river, making the river downstream, next to a populous Missouri town, 
unswimmable and undrinkable. The upstream state government may not 
have a strong incentive to take into account the harm to downstream, out­
of-state residents - a "negative externality" from an in-state activity that may 
generate jobs and tax revenue. The federal government accordingly may 
select more appropriate water pollution standards. In addition, a uniform 
federal approach will minimize the risk that states will "race to the bottom, " 
competing with each other to loosen their environmental or other standards 
so as to attract new business.14 Recent scholarship by Dean Richard Revesz 
argues that state regulators likely will select environmental standards that 
maximize citizen welfare overall rather than "racing to the bottom."15 Other 
scholars, including Professor Kirsten Engel, disagree, persuasively arguing 
that politicians may have a strong incentive to be perceived as doing "every­
thing possible" to attract a new business to the state, including relaxing envi­
ronmental standards below an optimal level.16 At a minimum, this scholarship 
raises important questions about whether state regulation may sometimes be 
affected by pathologies causing state regulators to choose less-than-optimal 
levels of environmental protection. 
Finally, a national standard can give each citizen an assurance - even 
something of an entitlement - to a minimum level of safety, health, or envi­
ronmental protection, no matter where he or she resides. A single federal 
approach, without separate state standard-setting, also has advantages for 
regulated entities. Those who must comply with regulation can face a 
14 Scott R. Saleska and Kirsten H. Engel, "'Facts Are Stubborn Things': An Empirical Reality 
Check in the Theoretical Debate over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Stand­
ard-Setting," CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 8, no. 1 (1998): 55-fo (describ­
ing "race to the bottom" in environmental context, whereby relaxation of local standards leads 
to decline in locality's social welfare). 
15 E.g., Richard L. Revesz, "The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: 
A Response to Critics," MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 82, no. 2 (1997): 535· 
16 See Saleska and Engel, "Facts Are Stubborn Things," SUPRA n. 14, at 74-84. 
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regulatory regime that is more certain and uniform and thereby avoid multi­
ple layers of regulation, which not only may be costly to comply with but also 
may be costly to figure out. This is one reason why regulated entities have 
frequently sought preemption. Pro-preemption arguments can have particular 
force when the regulatory requirement consists of a design requirement, such 
as specifying air-bag requirements for cars. Multiple design requirements 
could result in very high costs of compliance as manufacturers retool their 
assembly lines for different state requirements. 
A unitary federal approach might also save resources, as only one govern­
ment, the federal government, would invest its resources in developing regu­
latory standards. A fully encompassing federal regulation thus might benefit 
from economies of scale. Congress has sometimes completely preempted 
state regulatory requirements, as with the federal motor vehicle safety 
standards. 
A very appealing approach is to capture benefits on both sides by creating a 
hybrid, power-sharing arrangement between the federal government and the 
states. For example, as in many environmental laws, Congress may specify 
that federal law serve as a "floor" of minimum protection but that states 
remain free to adopt standards that are more protective of health or the 
environment. That gives citizens a minimum level of protection but leaves 
states free to experiment or satisfy local calls for stricter protection. Even with 
federal environmental standards in place, some citizens may still face acute 
localized risks, called "hot spots" by environmentalists; preserving state 
authority to go beyond federal standards can allow an effective response to 
these local problems.17 Alternatively, even if a particular consumer product 
does not violate federal standards, individuals injured by the product may still 
be free to go to state court and argue that under state tort law requiring, say, 
reasonable care, the manufacturer should be liable for product defects or 
failure to warn consumers. The continuing availability of tort claims is likely 
to prompt the manufacturer to address safety concerns that regulators have not 
yet anticipated. 
In addition, as some have argued in the environmental setting, concurrent 
state and federal authority furthers the goal of precaution, by ensuring that the 
more stringent standards, whether national or local, take precedence. States 
'7 See Zygmunt J. B. Plater et al., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY (New York: Aspen P ublishers, 2004), 335 (discussing benefits of "savings" clauses 
in federal legislation); Robert R. M. Verchick, "Fair Distribution of Environmental Harms 
and Benefits," in A NEW PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRON­
MENT, ed. Christopher Schroeder and Rena Steinzor (Durham, NC: Carolina Press, 2004) 
(discussing distributional harms in environmental policy). 
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are generally barred from adopting environmental standards that are less 
protective than federal ones. 
Finally, states implementing federal law under "delegated program" struc­
tures typically undertake significant responsibility to implement a federal 
program by, for example, developing their own individual requirements that 
will meet a federal program's goal or by issuing permits to individual compa­
nies or other entities that must comply with federal law. States thereby may 
retain greater flexibility to respond to local concerns - and to counterbalance 
federal authority- but within the framework of a federal program that seeks to 
address a particular issue at a national level. 
Assuming that the states and the federal government do not require, sav, 
disparate design standards, these sorts of power-sharing approaches can be 
advantageous and workable. They can help prevent "races to the bottom" 
and protect against federal inaction or other regulatory pathologies at both 
levels of government. However, they still may impose the burden on a partic­
ular company or entity of having to comply with more than one regulatory 
standard in a particular location. 
Assuming the importance of federalism interests and a state's autonomy to 
regulate, how might those interests best be protected in a federal regime? One 
position is that the federal legislative process can adequately protect state 
autonomy. The Supreme Court has cited this "political safeguards" approach, 
for example, in declining to judicially enforce the Tenth Amendment, with 
the exception of the anti-commandeering requirement, as a constraint on 
federal power over state governments. 
According to the "political safeguards" approach, Congress will select the 
appropriate balance between federal and state authority and will credit the 
need for state authority and autonomy. 18 First, state officials and organizations 
(such as associations of governors and attorneys general) frequently present 
their views through testimony to Congress or through informal means. Fur­
ther, members of Congress are elected by district or by state, and so have an 
incentive to take state interests into account in considering legislative pro­
posals. Moreover, Congress generally wants the cooperation and support of 
state governments in its programs and so will consistently consider state inter­
ests. Finally, because voters generally favor federalism values, members of 
Congress, responsive to electoral views, will also support state interests. 
'8 E.g., Larry D. Kramer, "Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism," 
COLUMBIA LAW Review 100, no. 1 (2000); 215; Herbert Wechsler, "The Political Safeguards of 
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Govern­
ment," COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 54, no. 4 (1954): 543· 
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But not everyone accepts the "political safeguards" view. Some experts 
contend that because there is no guarantee that Congress will protect state 
interests, courts should help preserve state autonomy and authority by inde­
pendently enforcing states' rights.19 For example, as discussed earlier, judges 
have been willing to strike down federal statutes as violating the Tenth 
Amendment because they "commandeer" state resources for use in federal 
programs. Some also might characterize the judicial presumption against 
preemption, discussed in the next section, as a lesser form of independent 
judicial protection of state authority and autonomy. 
PREEMPTION AND THE COURTS 
Even once Congress has enacted a federal statute, with a full opportunity for 
states and state organizations to have their views heard, whether the statute 
preempts state law and to what extent may not be altogether clear. Congress 
may not foresee a relevant change, such as a change in technology or in state 
regulatory practice. For example, some have criticized the preemption lan­
guage in the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which 
covers employee benefit plans; despite dramatic changes in the health care 
system - including an explosion of managed health care plans - the act has yet 
to be seriously updated.20 Sometimes Congress will deliberately not answer a 
preemption question because its members cannot reach agreement. For 
example, in the fall of 2006, Congress debated whether states should be 
preempted from requiring any further federal chemical plant security meas­
ures beyond those required under federal law. Congress could not reach 
agreement at the time, and 2006 legislation requiring the setting of federal 
chemical plant requirements included no language either preempting state 
law or "saving" state law. And of course, sometimes statutory language is writ­
ten in a way that is unintentionally vague or incomplete. 
When faced with such a statute in the context of a dispute over whether 
state law is preempted, courts must interpret the statute to decide whether it 
preempts the state from regulating. As discussed in greater detail by Professor 
Schroeder in Chapter 6, a court may conclude that Congress has "expressly 
preempted" state law, usually through statutory language that specifies which 
laws are preempted. Courts also may infer (through "implied preemption" 
'9 E.g., Frank B. Cross, "The Folly of Federalism," CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 24, no. 1 (2002): 1, 8-12; 
Marci A. Hamilton, "The Elusive Safeguards of Federalism," ANNALS OF AMERICAN ACAD­
EMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 574 (March 2001): 94· 
'0 E.g., Donald Bogan, "Protecting Patients' Rights Despite ERISA," TULANE LAW REVIEW 74, 
no. 3 (2000): 95r. 
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analysis) preemptive intent when state law "conflicts" with the federal law. 
Sometimes conflict arises when compliance with both state and federal law is 
physically impossible. Other times a court will find conflict when a state law 
poses an obstacle to the full accomplishment of a federal goal ("obstacle 
preemption"). Finally, a court might conclude, as the Supreme Court has 
with immigration law, that Congress has "occupied the field" of a particular 
regulatory area. This form of preemption, called "field preemption," is based 
both on congressional intent and on whether the federal government has 
traditionally controlled regulation in the area.21 
In determining whether Congress has preempted state law, modern courts 
have generally applied a presumption against preemption, especially in reg­
ulatory areas commonly left to the states. Courts have refused to find state law 
preempted unless a federal statute provides a "clear statement" that state law 
is to be preempted or other strong evidence that preemption is the "clear and 
manifest purpose" of Congress.22 
How might the presumption be justified? A plausible response is that it is 
not justified at all, because Congress possesses the largely unfettered power to 
preempt state law freely. The correct judicial response to a statute that might 
preempt state law accordingly might be to apply no presumption. But some­
times courts need a "tiebreaker" to resolve whether an ambiguously worded 
statute actually does preempt state law. As a clear "default" rule used to break 
such ties, the presumption against preemption also provides Congress with 
greater certainty about how courts will interpret statutory language that does 
not clearly address preemption.23 
Even though the use of some clearly stated tiebreaker by judges is useful, 
the question remains whether the judicial choice of the particular default rule -
against preemption - is the right choice or an inappropriate "thumb on the 
scale." Congress frequently guards state interests. Perhaps, then, the presump­
tion against preemption follows a reasonable assumption that unless Congress 
says otherwise, it does not intend to limit state regulation. However, congres­
sional intent with respect to state law is not always clear. In the absence of 
legislative language that "saves" state law, perhaps courts should assume that 
Congress's main concern is the effectiveness of federal law, a priority that 
overrides state law with conflicting rules or values. 
,. See, e.g., HINES v. DAVIDOWITZ, 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941) (finding Pennsylvania alien registration 
law preempted) .  22 See, e.g., RICE v. SANTA FE ELEVATOR CORP., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), quoted in MED­
TRONIC, INC. V. LOHR, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
23 See Nina Mendelson, "Chevron and Preemption," MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 102, no. 3 (2004): 
737, 745-46. 
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If the presumption against preemption does not represent a judge's best 
guess at Congress's actual intent, how else might it be understood? By requir­
ing a clear statement or some other strong evidence from Congress that it 
intends preemption, judges can reduce the chance of Congress thoughtlessly 
eclipsing state sovereignty. For example, if the statute specifically mentions 
state law preemption, it increases the chances that state law preemption will 
have received actual discussion in Congress. Thus, absent a clear statement or 
strong evidence, a presumption against preemption promotes legislative delib­
eration. Professor Bradford Clark, in Chapter 9, embraces this presumption, 
rooting his argument in the Constitution's language and structure. 
In addition to a procedural bias in favor of more deliberation, a clear 
statement rule also imposes a substantive bias in favor of state autonomy. 
By raising the bar to establish preemption, the rule effectively protects a larger 
field of state authority. That may serve a judicial desire to minimize congres­
sional tampering with the federal-state framework and, in the words of the 
Supreme Court, to avoid "serious intrusion into state sovereignty."24 The 
effect is to give state autonomy and authority some additional protection in 
court beyond what states have been able to obtain in the political process. 
Although such an approach seems inconsistent with the "political safeguards" 
approach embraced by the Supreme Court in other settings, advocates of this 
approach stress the constitutional importance of the federal-state balance and 
argue that relaxing judicial constraints might put the federal fox in charge of 
the states' chicken coop. They argue that courts should more actively patrol 
the line between states and the federal government as part of reinforcing the 
constitutional structure and supporting the "tradition" of federalism.25 
But applying a presumption against preemption also has significant down­
sides. For instance, insisting that courts always attempt to read statutes without 
clear preemptive language in the states' favor can force courts to adopt a more 
"federalist" interpretation of a statute even when that interpretation is not the 
best reading of the statute's language. Ours is a country of "laws, not men.',,6 Too 
many deviations from statutory language by judges can undermine the integrity 
of the law. At its worst, the presumption against preemption could become a 
cloak for illegitimate judicial policy choices - enabling what Professors William 
Eskridge and Philip Frickey call "under-the-table constitutional lawmaking.'
,
,7 
24 See MEDTRONIC, INC . ,  v. LOHR, 518 U.S. 470, 488 (1996) . 
'5 See sources cited SUPRA n. 19. 
'6 The phrase has been attributed to Livy. See Harold Bruff, "The Incompatibility Principle," 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 59, no. 2 (2007): 225. 
27 William N. Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey, "Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement 
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking," VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 45, no. 3 (1992): 593, 635 
(discussing clear statement rules). 
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Judges might simply be sneaking policy through the "back door," using the 
presumption against preemption to impose their own views of the correct bal­
ance of state and federal power. States can adequately protect the prerogative 
to regulate through their influence in Congress, and judges should be discour­
aged from displacing Congress by trying to minimize federal preemption of 
state law.28 
On this view, the judiciary might leave the question of state law preemption 
wholly to the political process, applying no presumption at all. Some argue 
that the policy choices involved in preserving or preempting state authority to 
regulate are more appropriately made on a case-by-case basis by Congress, our 
most democratic institution and the one most accountable to voters. The 
argument is even stronger, given Congress's clear power under the Constitu­
tion's Supremacy Clause to preempt state law as part of exercising its other 
constitutional authorities. 
In our view, preemption advocates make a persuasive claim - up to a 
point. Congress clearly has the prerogative to preempt state law and 
should not be forced to express that desire in any unusually specific or clear 
way as long as the ultimate meaning can be discerned. But where there is 
significant ambiguity, a rule favoring state authority is, it seems to us, appro­
priate. Such a clear intent rule would foster uniformity among courts and 
acknowledge the traditional interests in local control, while at the same time 
preserving for the Congress maximum latitude in expressing its desires. Pro­
fessor Clark examines compromise positions like this more completely in 
Chapter 9. 
SPECIAL CASES 
Disagreements about preemption, in the courtroom and in the academy, tend 
to revolve around certain kinds of cases in which the merits of federal or state 
interests seem particularly strong. Such "special cases" often involve questions 
about which branch is asserting preemption, the nature of the laws being 
preempted, or both. Another notable case involves federal provisions designed 
to "save" a role for state decision making. We emphasize the special cases for 
three reasons. First, they test the endurance of preemption advocates and 
skeptics by asking just how far each will go in defending a theoretical position. 
Second, special cases sometimes point to weaknesses in a background rule, 
suggesting the need for fine-tuning or even exceptions. Finally, because these 
cases are drawn from current controversies in law and politics, they acquaint 
2s Id. 
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readers with the new frontiers of preemption analysis. Here is where the 
rubber meets the road. 
W ho Is Preempting? 
Should preemption analysis change according to who is asserting preemption? 
Our analysis so far has assumed that Congress, explicitly or implicitly, com­
mands the preemption. But as discussed in greater depth in Professor William 
Funk's accompanying Chapter 10, recently we have seen a trend in which 
state preemption is imposed not by Congress, but by executive agencies. In 
2005, for instance, the Food and Drug Administration took the position that its 
labeling requirements for tuna preempted California's efforts to add any addi­
tional warnings on the product.29 The California label would have warned 
consumers about the threat of mercury contamination; the FDA would have 
required no warning label. That same year, the U.S. Department of Trans­
portation issued a proposed rule finding that its new "roof crush" standards for 
automobiles would preempt any additional requirements at the state level -
including findings of liability under state tort law.3° Sometimes, preemption is 
specifically authorized by Congress in the formative statute. Sometimes, as in 
the preceding examples, it is not. Agency-made regulation, if the agency is 
properly exercising the authority it received from Congress, can have the 
same preemptive effect as a federal statute.3' And if compliance with both 
an agency regulation and state law is physically impossible, the agency regu­
lation clearly prevails over the state law. Beyond this, courts and scholars 
disagree about how to interpret the bounds of underlying congressional 
authority. Must Congress expressly delegate to an agency the right to upend 
state law through regulatory act? Or may an agency infer such authority from 
less explicit or even ambiguous statutory language? If the latter, may agencies 
infer preemptive powers whenever convenient, or only as a "last resort" to 
accomplish federal goals? 
29 See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, "Letter to Bill Lockyer re a Suit Filed on June 21, 
2004, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. TRI-UNION SEAFOODS" (August 12, 2005) 
(available at www.cfsan.fda.gov/�dms/H-ltr65.html). 
Jo See National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration, Department of Transportation, 
"Proposed Rule: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance," FEDERAL 
REGISTER 70 (August 23, 2005): 49,223. 
J' See, e.g., LOUISIANA Pus. SERV. COMM'N v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986). ("Pre-emption 
may result not only from action taken by Congress itself; a federal agency acting within the 
scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation."); F IDELITY 
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSN. V. DE LA CUESTA, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). ("Federal 
regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes.") 
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A pro-preemption argument would assert that despite the agency twist, the 
federal actors should remain supreme. Federal agencies are enforcers of legis­
lative command, and courts should interfere as little as possible with the 
federal enforcement of federal law. Moreover, as enforcers and implementers 
of federal statutes, agency officials have the closest understanding of how to 
achieve federal goals.32 Agency officials are the first to know if the accomplish­
ment of their delegated mission has been jammed by state "obstacles" or 
transformed into a functional "impossibility." In addition, although agencies 
are naturally focused on federal goals, they have incentives to consider state 
interests and federalism values. Top executive agency officials are appointed 
by and report to the President, and, even in relatively liberal administrations, 
the White House has guarded traditions of federalism. For instance, President 
Clinton's Executive Order i3,13233 directs all federal agencies to be mindful of 
state powers when implementing federal law and specifically directs agencies 
(when possible) to favor interpretations that do not preempt state laws.34 
Should these safeguards fail, Congress always retains the power to correct 
agency overreaching by amending the authorizing statute. For example, in 
response to attempts by the Department of Homeland Security to preempt 
state security laws governing chemical facilities, Congress recently enacted 
a savings clause that preserves state law unless it actually conflicts with 
federal law.35 
Preemption skeptics argue that regulatory preemption must be carefully 
contained. Agency officials are not directly accountable to voters, they warn, 
and agencies lack consistent White House supervision, whatever the executive 
orders say. Federal agencies are, by design, focused on federal needs and 
powers rather than state interests. As a practical matter, federal agencies are 
not set up to evaluate and protect state regulatory powers - and they rarely 
do.36 By invoking obstacle preemption, a creative agency could preempt 
nearly any sort of state regulation simply by referencing a subordinate federal 
purpose that is somehow impeded by the state law. 37 Federal agencies are also 
sometimes subject to "capture" by big business and other powerful lobbies. 
32 Robert R. M. Verchick, "Toward Normative Rules for Agency Interpretation: Defining Juris­
diction under the Clean Water Act," ALABAMA LAW REVIEW 55, no. 3 (2004): 845. 
33 FEDERAL REGISTER 64 (1999): 43.255· 
34 But research suggests the directive is seldom followed. See Mendelson, SUPRA n. 23, at 783-4 
(documenting remarkably low compliance by agencies with Executive Order 13,132). 
35 See SUPRA n. 1. 
36 See SUPRA. n. 34-
37 See Nina Mendelson, "A Presumption against Agency Preemption," NORTHWESTERN UNI­
VERSITY LAW REVIEW 102, no. 2 (2008): 695. 
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All this makes an agency particularly ill-suited to weigh the interests of state 
and local interests in the course of accomplishing federal goals. 
On this issue, we side with preemption skeptics. Agencies lack the expertise 
to evaluate the federal-state balance, and it is unclear how serious an incentive 
they face to fully consider state interests. Accordingly, absent clear evidence 
that Congress intended to grant such authority to agencies, general rulemak­
ing delegation language should not be read to include the authority to pre­
empt state law. 
In 2007, the Supreme Court almost tested this argument in Watters v. 
Wachovia Bank.38 In a 5-3 decision (Justice Thomas did not participate), 
the Court upheld a policy of the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency that 
shielded real estate lending by national banks from state consumer protection 
laws. The Comptroller's office had based its policy on the National Bank Act's 
general grant of authority to prescribe "restrictions and requirements" for real 
estate lenders.39 The four appellate circuits examining the policy had found 
that although the statute did not preempt state consumer protection laws, the 
Comptroller's policy had; and because the statute granted the Comptroller 
broad powers, that agency-made preemption was just as valid as if it had been 
penned by Congress.40 But in upholding the Comptroller's policy, the 
Supreme Court refused that gambit. Instead it found, perhaps implausibly, 
that the banking statute had preempted state consumer protection laws all 
along.41 As a result, there was no need to decide whether a federal agency, on 
these or any other facts, has the independent power to preempt state law when 
Congress is mute. 
Still, the case is instructive. For one thing, it shows the murky progression 
from legislative to agency-based preemption: it is not always easy to tell where 
one ends and the other begins. For another, Wachovia Bank reminds us that 
courts can interpret a set of facts in surprisingly different ways, bypassing (or, 
some might say, deliberately avoiding) questions or doctrines that at first seem 
relevant. Finally, Wachovia Bank teaches us to pay attention to the national or 
local features of the subject matter involved. In reaching its conclusion, the 
Court repeatedly emphasized the national significance of the interstate bank­
ing system, a network now more than one hundred years old and deeply 
embedded in the federal-state structure. Perhaps a different case, involving 
a less traditional federal role or a less pervasive statutory system, would come 
13 127 S.Ct. 1559 (2007). 
39 Office of Comptroller of the Currency, "Notice: Preemption Determination and Order," 
FEDERAL REGISTER 68 (2003): 46,264. 
4° See WACHOVIA BANK, 127 S.Ct. at 1579 n. 16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing cases). 
4' See id. at 1569. 
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out differently. We examine the importance of regulatory subject matter in the 
next subsection. 
What Is Being Preempted? 
Perhaps courts should adjust their standards for preemption according to what 
sort of state or federal regulation is at stake. Judges already do this in some 
ways, although not always clearly or consistently. As generally understood, the 
presumption against preemption requires courts to "start with the assumption 
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded .. . 
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."42 The implica­
tion is that the presumption is most powerful where "the State's historic police 
powers" have been threatened.43 In contrast, the presumption may have less 
force "when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of 
significant federal presence."44 
Where federal lawmakers cut too close to the bone, the Supreme Court has 
occasionally gone further, requiring not just clear evidence of preemptive 
intent (an approach we favor), but a clear statement of intent within the 
statute. Thus, in Gregory v. Ashcroft45 the Supreme Court read a broad federal 
statute prohibiting age discrimination in employment not to cover state 
judges, leaving in place the state's constitutional requirement that state judges 
retire by age seventy. Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor 
warned that the Court should not "upset the usual constitutional balance of 
federal and state powers" unless Congress made "its intention to do so unmis­
takably clear in the language of the statute."46 Finding no clear statutory 
language intended to displace core state functions, the majority held that 
the age discrimination statute did not apply to state judges. In the environ­
mental area, courts have rejected agency statutory interpretations that might 
"encroach upon a traditional state power."47 
4' RICE v. SANTA FE ELEVATOR CORP., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
43 GEIER v. AM. HONDA MOTOR CORP., 529 U.S. 86!, 894 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
44 UNITED STATES v. LOCKE, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000). In addition, there is no presumption 
against preemption when a state intrudes on the sovereign prerogatives of the federal govern­
ment by directly regulating the federal government or its agents. See generally Seth P. Wax­
man and Trevor W. Morrison, "What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal 
Law, and the Supremacy Clause," YALE LAW JOURNAL 112, no. 8 (2003): 2195. 
45 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
46 Id. at 460-1 (quoting ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL v. SCANION, 473 U.S. 234, 242 [1985]) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
47 See SoLID WASTE AGENCY OF NORTHERN CooK CouNTY v. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGI­
NEERS, 531 U.S. 159, 172-3 (2001) (invalidating agency rule that asserted federal jurisdiction 
over certain intrastate waters under the federal Clean Water Act). 
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These practices have created a kind of "special case" analysis in which 
judges are reluctant to read federal laws to upset "historic" powers, "core" 
authority, or "traditional" balance. The rationale goes back to the debate 
about the Tenth Amendment and "political safeguards." Recall that, under 
today's understanding of the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment has been 
interpreted to protect state sovereignty in court in only limited ways, when 
federal law threatens to outright "commandeer" local executive or legislative 
resources. This understanding supplanted an earlier view, held a quarter 
century ago, that exclusively reserved to the states certain core powers, such 
as the authority to set labor standards for state employees.48 That view was 
abandoned in the i985 case Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority.49 The effect was that state powers would now, for the most part, 
be protected by Congress through the political process, rather than through 
categorical judicial standards. However, the Gregory case adds a gloss to this 
rule by imposing a high burden to show congressional intent to interfere with 
core state functions before a court will read a federal statute to regulate those 
functions. As the Court in that case put it: "[I]nasmuch as this Court in Garcia 
has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States against 
intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be abso­
lutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise."50 
Suggesting that a state law most deserves protection from preemption when 
it implicates a "core power" is not without difficulties. For one, it is sometimes 
hard to determine when a core power is at stake and when it is not. Is a federal 
law banning guns near schools a law about crime or about the local educa­
tional environment? Are federal restrictions on wetlands development more 
properly seen as national environmental protections or intrusions on the local 
core power of land-use planning? In addition, what should one do when a core 
state power confronts a core federal power? Wachovia Bank, for instance, 
pitted Michigan's traditionally local interest in consumer protection against 
the federal government's traditionally national interest in banking. Was the 
Court correct in refusing to apply a presumption against preemption in this 
special case? New Jersey's effort to impose additional safety requirements on 
local chemical plants suggests a similar situation. There the state's tradition­
ally local interest in public safety overlapped with the federal government's 
national interest in homeland security. For our part, we find arguments based 
on endemic powers very problematic. Sorting governmental interests is not 
like sorting checkers. Often particular regulatory interests cannot be assigned 
48 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
49 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
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to one side or the other; instead they are negotiated and shared. Modern 
theories of cooperative federalism and instrument choice emphasize this 
point. In addition, the categories used to define government objectives, like 
public safety or homeland security, are too easily manipulated by those aiming 
for a specific result. 
Still, it is possible to imagine other special cases where the state powers 
subject to preemption seem unusually important or deserving of protection. 
In Chapter 4, for example, Professor Morrison would require a clear statement 
of intent before a federal law can be invoked to preempt "the core enforce­
ment activities of an elected state attorney general."51 This rule, in his view, 
would promote local self-governance, by deferring to local law-enforcement 
interests pursued by a popularly elected state law-enforcement official. It 
would promote national democratic accountability by forcing Congress to 
specifically consider and issue a statement about preemption in this area 
before its laws could be used to undermine such local law-enforcement efforts. 
What Do "Savings Clauses" Save? 
As we mentioned earlier, federal statutes concerned with public health or the 
environment often include a provision that preserves a state's right to regulate 
in an even more protective way. In the last decade, such provisions, called 
"savings clauses," have stirred controversy in the federal courts. As Professor 
Sandi Zellmer shows in Chapter 7, these clauses have received erratic treat­
ment in the courts. Should savings clauses be interpreted broadly, as preemp­
tion skeptics argue? Or should they be read narrowly, as urged by advocates of 
national uniformity? The issue is ostensibly one of statutory interpretation. 
But because Congress can usually share or hoard its power as it sees fit, one's 
assessment often appears linked to views about federalism. 
In United States v. Locke,52 the Supreme Court unanimously held that the 
federal Oil Pollution Act of i990, despite the existence of several savings 
clauses, preempted Washington State's ability to regulate oil tankers operating 
in state waters. The Court reasoned that because the savings clauses appeared 
in a section of the statute titled, "Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation," 
their otherwise broad language must be restricted to liability rules and could 
not be read to permit "substantive regulation of a vessel's primary conduct."53 
5' See Trevor W. Morrison, ch. 4, "The State Attorney General and Preemption." Morrison 
would include an exception for cases in which compliance with both the state and federal laws 
was physically impossible. 
52 529 U.S. 89 (2000). 
53 Id. at 105. 
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As in the federal banking cases, the Court also emphasized the "federal" 
nature of the subject matter - in this case the "at-sea conduct of vessels" -
declining to "give broad effect to savings clauses where doing so would upset 
the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law."54 
Later in the same term, the Supreme Court narrowly construed another 
savings clause on a slightly different theory. In Geier v. American Honda Motor 
Co. ,55  the Court ruled 5-4 that a federal motor safety law preempted a state tort 
action alleging design defect for failure to include an air bag. Although the act 
expressly preempted "any safety standard" different from the federal standard, 
it included a savings clause stating that compliance with a federal standard 
"does not exempt any person from any liability under common law."56 Never­
theless, the savings clause was insufficient to rescue the "no air bags" tort 
claim. The Court reasoned that the tort suit presented an obstacle that "con­
flicts" with the federal goal of preserving manufacturer flexibility to phase in 
air bags, thus creating a case for implied preemption.57 The savings clause, the 
Court found, was not worded in a way to save state laws from implied pre­
emption. Rather, the clause seemed targeted only at the express preemption 
contained in the "any safety standard" language. 
The Geier opinion left many lawyers wondering what a savings clause is 
now able to save. The majority insisted that it had not changed any back­
ground preemption rules and suggested that savings clauses could negate 
obstacle preemption if properly worded, although it did not say how. 58 Justice 
Stevens, in dissent, accused the majority of unfurling a blanket rule that 
would always protect obstacle preemption from savings clauses. 59 He sug­
gested the majority had dumped the traditional presumption against preemp­
tion in favor of the more immediate needs of the Department of 
T . 60 ransportahon. 
Can Congress, through a savings clause, deactivate implied preemption 
when state law poses obstacles to federal goals? Does such a functional barrier 
now conjure (as Justice Stevens decries) a sort of presumption against the 
presumption against preemption? The answer to the first question is presum­
ably yes, because Congress in theory is free to create statutory goals flexible 
enough to tolerate state obstacles. Even so, Geier suggests this intent must be 
54 Id. at 106. 
55 529 U.S. 86! (2000). 
56 15 u.s.c. s i397(k). 
57 GEIER, 529 U.S. at 87i. 
58 Id. at 872. 
59 Id. at 900 n. i6 (Stevens, J., dissenting). ("The [majority] contends, in essence, that a savings 
clause cannot foreclose implied conflict pre-emption.") 
60 Id. at 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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stated very clearly. We may be approaching the point where "clear state­
ments" are necessary both to invoke and to avoid preemption. The answer 
to the second question is in the eye of the beholder. Although the presumption 
against preemption is in no danger of abandonment, it does - in our view -
occasionally get misplaced. 
CONCLUSION 
As American federalism makes clear, redundancy is complicated. The push­
me-pull-you model of shared government offers big advantages, such as dem­
ocratic responsiveness, innovation, and flexibility. But the costs are real, not 
the least of which is the judicial effort necessary to keep all players within their 
appropriate bounds. What makes this area of the law so fascinating is that, if 
you study it long enough, it will inevitably pit your principles against a desired 
outcome. States' rights look good to an environmentalist favoring stricter auto 
pollution laws in California or safer standards at New Jersey chemical plants. 
But states' rights arguments have also been used by courts to limit the pro­
tection of the nation's wetlands and immunize state agencies from environ­
mental citizen suits. Conservatives have the same problem, sometimes 
struggling, for instance, to show why federal gun restrictions may not be 
foisted on the states but why federal marijuana restrictions may.61 Although 
not all of these cases involve preemption, they do involve the basic values at 
stake in the preemption debate, namely a concern for local democracy and 
state experimentation, on one side, and a desire for national uniformity and 
efficiency on the other. 
61 See GONZALES v. �ICH, 545 U.S. I (2005) (upholding despite Commerce Clause challenge 
federal criminal ban on the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana by intrastate 
growers and users of marijuana for medicinal reasons). 
